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Abstract 
The hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve has been criticized for lacking a micro-foundation. In 
this paper, an alternative purely forward-looking model of the Phillips curve is constructed on 
the basis of a micro-foundation of trend inflation. In addition, another source of output gaps 
other than frictions―a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path―is considered. The model 
indicates that the role of frictions has been overestimated and that frictions are less important 
than previously have been thought. The conventional monetary policy of utilizing frictions 
cannot necessarily stabilize inflation. In contrast, the monetary policy of controlling the 
government’s preference is very effective. A problem is that the effects of both types of 
monetary policy are not distinguishable.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The pure New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) has been criticized for possessing the serious 
problem that it is not consistent with the observed highly persistent nature of inflation (e.g., 
Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Galí and Gertler, 1999). Mankiw (2001) argues that the NKPC is 
ultimately a failure and is not consistent with standard stylized facts about the dynamic effects 
of monetary policy. Since the work of Galí and Gertler (1999), a modified version of the 
NKPC—that is, a hybrid NKPC that includes lagged inflation—has been intensely studied. The 
hybrid NKPC well captures the persistent nature of inflation, but it remains puzzling why 
rational agents would behave in backward-looking manners, even if only partially so. Galí et al. 
(2005) argue that an important unresolved issue is the provision of a more coherent rationale for 
the role of lagged inflation in the hybrid NKPC. Furthermore, Fuhrer (2006) concluded that 
inflation in the hybrid NKPC inherits relatively little persistence from the driving process and 
that a micro-founded mechanism that generates substantial intrinsic persistence in inflation is 
required. 
 Recently, an alternative approach has been presented that argues that high intrinsic 
inflation persistence is spurious as a result of trend inflation. Cogley and Sbordone (2005, 2006) 
show that, if trend inflation is incorporated into the pure NKPC, its performance on fitting 
actual inflation data improves greatly. They conclude that trend inflation has been historically 
quite volatile and that, if these fluctuations of long-run moving trend inflation are taken into 
account, a purely forward-looking model approximates the short-run dynamics of inflation quite 
well. Woodford (2007) considers that Cogley and Sbordone (2005) present an alternative 
interpretation of the apparent need for lagged inflation terms in the NKPC (see also Hornstein, 
2007). Indeed, data on inflation in most industrial economies show high levels of volatility and 
a transition from high inflation to low inflation in the 1980s, which strongly implies the 
existence of trends in inflation (e.g., Stock and Watson, 2006; Sbordone, 2007). Ascari (2004) 
argues that disregarding trend inflation is very far from being an innocuous assumption and that 
the results obtained by models log-linearized around a zero inflation steady state are misleading 
(see also Bakhshi et al., 2003). These studies suggest that the puzzle of inflation persistence in 
the NKPC will be solved by incorporating trend inflation into the NKPC. However, if we 
proceed further in this research direction, another serious theoretical problem arises, that is, the 
lack of a micro-foundation of trend inflation. Can trend inflation be explained as a consequence 
of rational agents’ optimizations? Why do monetary policymakers often allow upward trends in 
inflation? This paper presents a micro-foundation of trend inflation.  
 The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) argues that a problem with conventional 
inflation theory is that it largely neglects the importance of the government’s borrowing 
behavior in inflation dynamics (e.g., Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994, 1998, 2001; Woodford, 1995, 
2001; Cochrane, 1998a, 1998b, 2005). The FTPL implies that, if a government’s borrowing 
behavior is well modeled, the mechanism of severely deviated inflation paths can be explained 
without assuming ad hoc frictions or irrationality. In this paper, this possibility is explored and a 
model of trend inflation that is firmly based on a micro-foundation is constructed (see 
Harashima, 2008b). The model indicates that trend inflation accelerates or decelerates if the 
time preference rates of the government and the representative household are heterogeneous.  
 Another important factor in the Phillips curve that should also be carefully examined 
is the nature of output gaps. In the NKPC, output gaps are assumed to be generated only by 
frictions. Without frictions, no output gaps can exist because, if an economy is under full price 
flexibility, its equilibrium output level is always sustained. However, this New Keynesian 
explanation has not generally been regarded as sufficiently successful, because price rigidity has 
been criticized for its fragile theoretical (micro-) foundation and its inability to explain the 
persistent nature of inflation. As shown above, Mankiw (2001) severely criticized the NKPC. 
This criticism implies that there will be other sources of output gaps. In this paper, I consider 
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another source of output gaps that are generated even under full price flexibility (see 
Harashima, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). Rational agents will usually not allow Pareto inefficiency 
(e.g., output gaps) to remain for a long period; it will disappear soon after it is generated under 
full price flexibility. However, an exception is possible because a Nash equilibrium can 
conceptually coexist with Pareto inefficiency. If a Nash equilibrium that consists of strategies 
that generate Pareto inefficient payoffs is rationally selected, rigidity-like phenomena may be 
observed. This paper shows that a Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto 
inefficient transition path of consumption to the steady state (hereafter called a “Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path”) is generated even in a frictionless economy if—and 
probably only if—the rate of time preference shifts. An essential reason for the generation of 
this path is that households are intrinsically risk averse and not cooperative. In a strategic 
environment, this generates the possibility that, if consumption needs to be substantially and 
discontinuously increased to keep Pareto optimality, a non-cooperative household’s strategy to 
deviate from the Pareto optimal path gives a higher expected utility than the strategy of 
choosing the Pareto optimal path.   
 The above-mentioned two factors (a model of trend inflation and a mechanism of 
output gaps under full price flexibility) are considered in analyses of monetary policies, and an 
alternative model of the Phillips curve is constructed. In contrast to the NKPC, both factors are 
fully based on micro-foundations. Comparisons between this new model and the NKPC indicate 
that the role of frictions has been overestimated and that frictions are less important than has 
been thought.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I construct a model of trend inflation 
that assumes an economically Leviathan government, in which the government and the 
representative household behave in purely forward-looking manners and achieve simultaneous 
optimization. Section 3 shows that a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is rationally 
generated when the time preference rates of risk-averse and non-cooperative households shift. 
In Section 4, a new model of the Phillips curve is constructed and compared with the NKPC. 
Finally, I offer concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
2  TREND INFLATION 
 
2.1  The model of trend inflation1 
2.1.1  The government 
2.1.1.1  The government budget constraint 
The government budget constraint is 
 
 
tttttt XGiBB 
  , 
 
where Bt is the nominal obligation of the government to pay for its accumulated bonds, it is the 
nominal interest rate for government bonds, Gt is the nominal government expenditure, Xt is the 
nominal tax revenue, and 
t  is the nominal amount of seigniorage at time t. The tax is assumed 
to be lump sum, the government bonds are long term, and the returns on the bonds are realized 
only after the bonds are held during a unit period (e.g., a year). The government bonds are 
redeemed in a unit period, and the government successively refinances the bonds by issuing new 
ones at each time t. Let 
t
t
t
P
B
b  , 
t
t
t
P
G
g  , 
t
t
t
P
X
x  , and 
t
t
t
P

  , where Pt is the price level 
                                                          
1 The model of the optimal trend inflation in this paper is based on the inflation model in Harashima (2007). 
Harashima (2004b, 2008a, 2013a) are also related to the model and analyses in this paper.. 
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at time t. Let also 
t
t
t
P
P
π

  be the inflation rate at time t. By dividing by Pt, the budget 
constraint is transformed to 
ttttt
t
t xgib
P
B


, which is equivalent to 
 
  tttttttttttttt xgπibπbxgibb    .              (1) 
 
 Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the bonds 
during a unit period, investors buy the bonds if  dsrπEi
t
t
sstt 


1
 at time t, where 
ti  is 
the nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t and rt is the real interest rate in markets at t. 
Hence, by arbitrage,  dsrπEi
t
t
sstt 


1
 and if rt is constant such that rrt   (i.e., if it is at 
steady state), then 
 
 rdsπEi
t
t
stt  
1
 . 
 
The nominal interest rate rdsπEi
t
t
stt  
1
 means that, during a sufficiently small period 
between t and t + dt, the government’s obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in the future 
increases not by  rπdt t   but by 



 

rdsπEdt
t
t
st
1
. If πt is constant, then t
t
t
st πdsπE 
1
 
and rπi tt  , but if πt is not constant, these equations do not necessarily hold. 
 Since bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds the 
government is holding at t have been issued between t - 1 and t. Hence, under perfect foresight, 
the average nominal interest rate for all government bonds at time t is the weighted sum of 
ti  
such that 
 
 rds
dvB
B
dvπds
dvB
B
ii
t
t t
t
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s
s
v
t
t t
t
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
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


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


1
1
,
,
1
1
1
,
,  , 
 
where 
tsB ,  is the nominal value of bonds at time t that were issued at time s. If the weights 
 
t
t
tv
ts
dvB
B
1
,
,  between t - 1 and t are not so different from each other, then approximately 
rdsdυπi
t
t
s
s
υt   

1
1
. To be precise, if the absolute values of πs for 11  tst  are 
sufficiently smaller than unity, the differences among the weights are negligible and then 
approximately 
 
rdsdυπi
t
t
s
s
υt   

1
1
                        (2) 
 
(see Harashima, 2008). The average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds, 
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therefore, develops by rdsdυπi
t
t
s
s
υt   

1
1
. If πt is constant, then dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
 
tπ ; thus, rπi tt  . If πt is not constant, however, the equations t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 
and it = πt + r do not necessarily hold.  
 
2.1.1.2  An economically Leviathan government  
Under a proportional representation system, the government represents the median household 
whereas the representative household from an economic perspective represents the mean 
household.
2
 Because of this difference, they usually have different preferences. To account for 
this essential difference, a Leviathan government is assumed in the model.
3
 There are two 
extremely different views regarding government’s behavior in the literature on political 
economy: the Leviathan view and the benevolent view (e.g., Downs 1957; Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980; Alesina and Cukierman 1990). From an economic point of view, a benevolent 
government maximizes the expected economic utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. Whereas the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool 
used to maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a 
Leviathan government is a tool used to achieve the government’s own policy objectives.4 For 
example, if a Leviathan government considers national security to be the most important 
political issue, defense spending will increase greatly, but if improving social welfare is the top 
political priority, spending on social welfare will increase dramatically, even though the 
increased expenditures may not necessarily increase the economic utility of the representative 
household. 
 Is it possible, however, for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long 
period? Yes, because a government is generally chosen by the median of households under a 
proportional representation system (e.g., Downs 1957), whereas the representative household 
usually presumed in the economics literature is the mean household. The economically 
representative household is not usually identical to the politically representative household, and 
a majority of people could support a Leviathan government even if they know that the 
government does not necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of the economically 
representative household. In other words, the Leviathan government argued here is an 
economically Leviathan government that maximizes the political utility of people, whereas the 
conventional economically benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people. In 
addition, because the politically and economically representative households are different (the 
median and mean households, respectively), the preferences of future governments will also be 
similarly different from those of the mean representative household. In this sense, the current 
and future governments presented in the model can be seen as a combined government that goes 
on indefinitely; that is, the economically Leviathan government always represents the median 
representative household. 
 The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government 
expenditure, tax revenue, or related activities in the government’s political utility function (e.g., 
Edwards and Keen 1996). Because an economically Leviathan government derives political 
utility from expenditure for its political purposes, the larger the expenditure is, the happier the 
Leviathan government will be. But raising tax rates will provoke people’s antipathy, which 
                                                          
2 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay in reforms 
(e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
3 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
4 The government behavior assumed in the fiscal theory of the price level reflects an aspect of a Leviathan 
government. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in 
which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in advance of prices 
being determined in markets. 
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increases the probability of being replaced by the opposing party that also nearly represents the 
median household. Thus, the economically Leviathan government regards taxes as necessary 
costs to obtain freedom of expenditure for its own purposes. The government therefore will 
derive utility from expenditure and disutility from taxes. Expenditure and taxes in the political 
utility function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the 
economic utility function of the representative household. Consumption and labor hours are 
both control variables, and as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenue are also 
control variables. As a whole, the political utility function of economically Leviathan 
government can be expressed as uG(gt, xt).
5
 In addition, it can be assumed on the basis of 
previously mentioned arguments that 0


t
G
g
u
 and 0
2
2



t
G
g
u
, and therefore that 0


t
G
x
u
 
and 0
2
2



t
G
x
u
.
6
 An economically Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected 
sum of these utilities discounted by its time preference rate under the constraint of deficit 
financing. 
 
2.1.1.3  The optimization problem 
The optimization problem of an economically Leviathan government is  
 
   dttθ,xguEMax GttG 

exp
0
 
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
   ttttttt xgπibb   ,                       (3) 
 
where uG is the constant relative risk aversion utility function of the government, θG is the 
government’s rate of time preference, and E is the expectation operator. All variables are 
expressed in per capita terms, and population is assumed to be constant. The government 
maximizes its expected political utility considering the behavior of the economically 
representative household that is reflected in it in its budget constraint. 
 
2.1.2  Households 
The economically representative household maximizes its expected economic utility. Sidrauski 
(1967)’s well-known money in the utility function model is used for the optimization problem. 
The representative household maximizes its expected utility 
 
   dttθm,cuE PttP 

exp
0
 
                                                          
5 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case, the utility function of a government 
can be assumed to be  ttttG l,c,x,gu , where ct is real consumption and lt is the leisure hours of the representative 
household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies do not affect steady-state consumption 
and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed to be  ttG x,gu . 
6 Some may argue that it is more likely that 
0


t
G
x
u and 
0
2
2



t
G
x
u . However, the assumption used is not an 
important issue here because    
0
2
2
1













t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
,xgu
x
,xgu
x
  at steady state, as will be shown in the solution to 
the optimization problem later in the paper. Thus, the results are not affected by which assumption is used.  
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subject to the budget constraint 
 
      tttttttttt gmrπcσwara   , 
 
where uP and θP are the utility function and the time preference rate of the representative 
household, ct is real consumption, wt is real wage, σt is lump-sum real government transfers, mt 
is real money, at = kt + mt, and kt is real capital. It is assumed that rt = f’(kt), tw  
   ttt kfkkf  , 0'uP , 0"uP , 
 
0


t
ttP
m
m,cu
, and 
 
0
2
2



t
ttP
m
m,cu
, where  f  is the 
production function. Government expenditure (gt) is an exogenous variable for the 
representative household because it is an economically Leviathan government. It is also 
assumed that, although all households receive transfers from a government in equilibrium, when 
making decisions, each household takes the amount it receives as given, independent of its 
money holdings. Thus, the budget constraint means that the real output  tkf  at any time is 
demanded for the real consumption ct, the real investment tk
 , and the real government 
expenditure gt such that   tttt gkckf   . The representative household maximizes its 
expected economic utility considering the behavior of government reflected in gt in the budget 
constraint. In this discussion, a central bank is not assumed to be independent of the 
government; thus, the functions of the government and the central bank are not separated. This 
assumption can be relaxed, and the roles of the government and the central bank are explicitly 
separated in Section 2.2. 
 Note that the time preference rate of government (θG) is not necessarily identical to 
that of the representative household (θP) because the government and the representative 
household represent different households (i.e., the median and mean households, respectively). 
In addition, the preferences will differ because (1) even though people want to choose a 
government that has the same time preference rate as the representative household, the rates 
may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., Alesina and Cukierman 1990); and (2) current 
voters cannot bind the choices of future voters and, if current voters are aware of this possibility, 
they may vote more myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private 
economic activities (e.g., Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Hence, it is highly likely that the time 
preference rates of a government and the representative household are heterogeneous. It should 
be also noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, an 
economically Leviathan government behaves based only on its own time preference rate, 
without hesitation. 
 
2.1.3  The simultaneous optimization 
First, I examine the optimization problem of the representative household. Let Hamiltonian HP 
be       ttttttttttP,PttPP gmrπcσwarλtθm,cuH  exp , where λP,t is a costate 
variable, ct and mt are control variables, and at is a state variable. The optimality conditions for 
the representative household are;  
 
 
  tP,P
t
ttP λtθ
c
m,cu



exp  ,                       (4) 
 
 
   tttP,P
t
ttP rπλtθ
m
m,cu



exp  ,                    (5) 
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ttP,tP, rλλ 
  ,                             (6) 
 
    ttttttttt gmrπcσwraa   ,                (7) 
 
0lim 

ttP,
t
aλ  .                           (8) 
 
By conditions (4) and (5), 
   
tt
t
ttP
t
ttP rπ
m
m,cu
c
m,cu











1
, and by conditions (4) and (6),  
 
   
tP
t
t
t
ttP
t
ttP
t rθ
c
c
c
m,cu
c
m,cu
c 













2
2
1
 .                 (9) 
 
Hence, 
 
θP = rt = r                              (10) 
 
at steady state such that 0tc  and 0tk
 . 
 Next, I examine the optimization problem of the economically Leviathan government. 
Let Hamiltonian HG be       tttttttG,GttGG xgπibλtθx,guH  exp , where λG,t is a 
costate variable. The optimality conditions for the government are;  
 
 
  tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
g
x,gu



exp  ,                      (11) 
 
 
  tG,G
t
ttG λtθ
x
x,gu



exp  ,                      (12) 
 
 tttG,tG, πiλλ   ,                           (13) 
 
  ttttttt xgπibb   ,                      (14) 
 
0lim 

ttG,
t
bλ  .                            (15) 
 
Combining conditions (11), (12), and (13) and equation (2) yields the following equations: 
 
   
t
t
t
s
s
υtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t πdsdυπrπiθ
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gu
g 










  


1
1
2
2
1

      (16) 
 
and  
 
   
t
t
t
s
s
υtttG
t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t πdsdυπrπiθ
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gu
x 










  


1
1
2
2
1

 .     (17) 
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Here, 
   
0
2
2
1












t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
g
g
g
x,gu
g
x,gu
g

 and 
   
0
2
2
1












t
t
t
ttG
t
ttG
t
x
x
x
x,gu
x
x,gu
x

 at 
steady state such that 0tg  and 0tx ; thus, 
 
t
t
t
s
s
υtG πdsdυπrθ   

1
1
 .                   (18) 
 
Hence, by equation (10), 
 
PGt
t
t
s
s
υ θθπdsdυπ  

1
1
                     (19) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk
 .7   
 Equation (19) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by the 
economically Leviathan government and the representative household. If the rates of time 
preference are heterogeneous between them, then 
 
 
t
t
t
s
s
υt πdsdυπri   

1
1
 . 
 
This result might seem surprising because it has been naturally conjectured that it = πt + r. 
However, this is a simple misunderstanding because πt indicates the instantaneous rate of 
inflation at a point such that 
t
t
t
P
P
π

 , whereas dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
 roughly indicates the 
average inflation rate in a period. Equation (19) indicates that πt develops according to the 
integral equation 
PG
t
t
s
s
υt θθdsdυππ   

1
1
. If πt is constant, the equations rπi tt   and 
t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 are true. However, if πt is not constant, the equations do not necessarily 
hold. Equation (19) indicates that the equations rπi tt   and t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 hold 
only in the case where θG = θP (i.e., a homogeneous rate of time preference). It has been 
previously thought that a homogeneous rate of time preference naturally prevails; thus, the 
equation it = πt + r has not been questioned. As argued previously, however, a homogeneous 
rate of time preference is not usually guaranteed. 
 
2.1.4  The law of motion for trend inflation 
Equation (19) indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates as a result of the government and 
the representative household reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneous rates of time 
preference. If πt is constant, the equation dsdυππ
t
t
s
s
υt  


1
1
 holds; conversely, if tπ  
dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
, then πt is not constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of inflation, 
                                                          
7 If and only if 
t
ttt
G
b
xg
θ


 at steady state, then the transversality condition (15) 0lim 

ttG,
t
bλ  holds. 
The proof is shown in Harashima (2008b). 
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therefore, equation (19) cannot hold in an economy in which 
PG θθ  . In other words, it is not 
until 
PG θθ   that inflation can accelerate or decelerate. Heterogeneous time preferences 
(
PG θθ  ) bend the path of inflation and enables inflation to accelerate or decelerate. The 
difference of time preference rates (
PG θθ  ) at each time needs to be transformed to the 
accelerated or decelerated inflation rate πt at each time.  
     Equation (19) implies that inflation accelerates or decelerates nonlinearly in the case in 
which 
PG θθ  . For a sufficiently small period dt, dttπ 1  is determined with πs  11  tst  
that satisfies 
PGt
t
t
s
s
υ θθπdsdυπ  

1
1
, so as to hold the equation dsdυπ
dtt
t
s
s
υ 
 1
 
tdtt
dtt
t
s
s
υ ππdsdυπ  



 
1
1
1
. A solution of the integral equation (19) for given θG and 
θP is 
 
  20 6 tθθππ PGt   .                         (20) 
 
Generally, the path of inflation that satisfies equation (19) for t0  is expressed as 
 
    tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60   ,                     (21) 
 
where zt is a time dependent variable. The stream of zt is various depending on the boundary 
condition, i.e., the past and present inflation during 01  t  and the path of inflation during 
10  t  that is set to make π0 satisfy equation (19). However, zt has the following important 
property. If πt satisfies equation (19) for t0 , and  tπ  for 11  t , then  
 
 2lim 

t
t
z  . 
 
Proof is shown in Harashima (2008b). Any inflation path that satisfies equation (19) for t0  
therefore asymptotically approaches the path of equation (20). The mechanism behind the law 
of motion for inflation (equation [20]) is examined more in detail in Harashima (2008b). 
 
2.1.5  The optimal trend inflation 
The trend inflation should be consistent with equation (21). The discrete-time version of 
equation (21) is 
 
     tzθθππ tPG
T
φ
T
t lnexp6                     (22) 
 
and equivalently 
 
           tztzθθππ ttPG
T
t
T
t lnexp1lnexp6 11       (23) 
 
where T
tπ  is the trend component in inflation in period t, and  t  is the period when the 
latest shock on 
Gθ  occurred. It will be explained later in Section 2.2 that Gθ  should be 
time-variable and shocks on 
Gθ  play an important role in inflation dynamics. When a shock on 
Gθ  occurs and the value of Gθ  is changed in period  , the trend inflation need be adjusted 
to be consistent with the new value of 
Gθ  for the new initial period  . The value of zt is 
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determined by the mechanism explained in Section 2.1.2. Equations (22) and (23) are used in 
the model as the trend component in inflation. 
 
2.2  The central bank 
In Section 2.1, central banks are not explicitly considered because they are not assumed to be 
independent of governments. However, in actuality, central banks are independent organizations 
in most countries even though some of them are not sufficiently independent. Furthermore, in 
the conventional inflation model, it is the central banks that control inflation and governments 
have no role in controlling inflation. Conventional inflation models show that the rate of 
inflation basically converges at the target rate of inflation set by a central bank. The target rate 
of inflation therefore is the key exogenous variable that determines the path of inflation in these 
models.  
 Both the government and the central bank can probably affect the development of 
inflation, but they would do so in different manners, as equation (21) and conventional inflation 
models indicate. However, the objectives of the government and the central bank may not be the 
same. For example, if trend inflation is added to conventional models by replacing their 
aggregate supply equations with equation (21), inflation cannot necessarily converge at the 
target rate of inflation because another key exogenous variable (
Gθ ) is included in the models. 
A government makes inflation develop consistently with the equation (21), which implies that 
inflation will not necessarily converge at the target rate of inflation. Conversely, a central bank 
makes inflation converge at the target rate of inflation, which implies that inflation will not 
necessarily develop consistently with equation (21). That is, unless either 
Gθ  is adjusted to be 
consistent with the target rate of inflation or the target rate of inflation is adjusted to be 
consistent with 
Gθ , the path of inflation cannot necessarily be determined. Either Gθ  or the 
target rate of inflation need be an endogenous variable. If a central bank dominates, the target 
rate of inflation remains as the key exogenous variable and 
Gθ  should then be an endogenous 
variable. The reverse is also true.  
 A central bank will be regarded as truly independent if 
Gθ  is forced to be adjusted to 
the one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation set by the central bank. For example, 
suppose that 
PG θθ   and a truly independent central bank manipulates the nominal interest 
rate. Here, 
 
tG
t
t
s
s
vt πθrdsdvπi   

1
1
                     (24) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk
  by equations (1), (7), and 
(13). If the accelerating inflation rate is higher than the target rate of inflation, the central bank 
can raise the nominal interest rate from 
tGt πθi   (equation (24)) to 
 
ψπθi tGt   
 
by positive ψ  by intervening in financial markets to lower the accelerating rate of inflation. In 
this case, the central bank keeps the initial target rate of inflation because it is truly independent. 
The government thus faces a rate of increase of real obligation that is higher than 
Gθ  by the 
extra rate ψ.8 If the government lowers 
Gθ  so that PG θθ   and inflation stops accelerating, 
                                                          
8 The extra rate ψ affects not only the behavior of government but also that of the representative household, in which 
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the central bank will accordingly reduce the extra rate ψ . If, however, the government does not 
accommodate 
Gθ  to the target rate of inflation, the extra rate ψ  will increase as time passes 
because of the gap between the accelerating inflation rate and the target rate of inflation widens. 
Because of the extra rate ψ , the government has no other way to achieve optimization unless it 
lowers 
Gθ  to one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation. Once the government 
recognizes that the central bank is firmly determined to be independent and it is in vain to try to 
intervene in the central bank’s decision makings, the government would not dare to attempt to 
raise 
Gθ  again anymore. 
 Equation (22) implies that a government allows inflation to accelerate because it acts 
to maximize its expected utility based only on its own preferences. A government is hardly the 
only entity that cannot easily control its own preferences even when these preferences may 
result in unfavorable consequences. It may not even be possible to manipulate one’s own 
preferences at will. Thus, even though a government is fully rational and is not weak, foolish, or 
untruthful, it is difficult for it to self-regulate its preferences. Hence, an independent neutral 
organization is needed to help control 
Gθ . Delegating the authority to set and keep the target 
rate of inflation to an independent central bank is a way to control 
Gθ . The delegated 
independent central bank will control 
Gθ  because it is not the central bank’s preference to 
stabilize the price level—it is simply a duty delegated to it. An independent central bank is not 
the only possible choice. For example, pegging the local currency with a foreign currency can 
be seen as a kind of delegation to an independent neutral organization. In addition, the gold 
standard that prevailed before World War II can be also seen as a type of such delegation. 
 Note also that the delegation may not be viewed as bad from the Leviathan 
government’s point of view because only its rate of time preference is changed, and the 
government can still pursue its political objectives. One criticism of the argument that central 
banks should be independent (e.g., Blinder 1998) is that, since the time-inconsistency problem 
argued in Kydland and Prescott (1977) or Barro and Gordon (1983) is more acute with fiscal 
policy, why is it not also necessary to delegate fiscal policies? An economically Leviathan 
government, however, will never allow fiscal policies to be delegated to an independent neutral 
organization because the Leviathan government would then not be able to pursue its political 
objectives, which in a sense would mean the death of the Leviathan government. The median 
household that backs the Leviathan government, but at the same time dislikes high inflation, 
will therefore support the delegation of authority but only if it concerns monetary policy. The 
independent central bank will then be given the authority to control 
Gθ  and oblige the 
government to change 
Gθ  in order to meet the target rate of inflation. 
 Without such a delegation of authority, it is likely that generally 
PG θθ   because 
Gθ  represents the median household whereas Pθ  represents the mean household. Empirical 
studies indicate that the rate of time preference negatively correlates with permanent income 
(e.g., Lawrance 1991), and the permanent income of the median household is usually lower than 
that of the mean household. If generally 
PG θθ  , that suggests that inflation will tend to 
accelerate unless a central bank is independent. The independence of the central bank is 
therefore very important in keeping the path of inflation stable. 
     Note also that the forced adjustments of 
Gθ  by an independent central bank are 
exogenous shocks to both the government and the representative household because they are 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the conventional inflation theory is particularly interested. In this sense, the central bank’s instrument rule that 
concerns and simultaneously affects both behaviors of the government and the representative household is 
particularly important for price stability. 
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planned solely by the central bank. When a shock on 
Gθ  is given, the government and the 
representative household must recalculate their optimal paths including the path of inflation by 
resetting 
Gθ , tπ , and φ  in equation (22).     
 
3  OUTPUT GAPS 
 
3.1  Model with non-cooperative households 9 
This section examines another source of output gaps other than frictions. A Ramsey type growth 
model with non-cooperative households is constructed to examine economic fluctuations.   
 
3.1.1  The shock 
The model describes the utility maximization of households after an upward time preference 
shock. This shock was chosen because it is one of the few shocks that result in a Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Another important reason for selecting an upward time 
preference shock is that it shifts the steady state to lower levels of production and consumption 
than before the shock, which is consistent with the phenomena actually observed in a recession.  
  Although the rate of time preference is a deep parameter, it has not been regarded as a 
source of shocks for economic fluctuations, possibly because the rate of time preference is 
thought to be constant and not to shift suddenly. There is also a practical reason, however. 
Models with a permanently constant rate of time preference exhibit excellent tractability (see 
Samuelson, 1937). However, the rate of time preference has been naturally assumed and 
actually observed to be time-variable. The concept of a time-varying rate of time preference has 
a long history (e.g., Böhm-Bawerk, 1889; Fisher, 1930). More recently, Lawrance (1991) and 
Becker and Mulligan (1997) showed that people do not inherit permanently constant rates of 
time preference by nature and that economic and social factors affect the formation of time 
preference rates. Their arguments indicate that many incidents can affect and change the rate of 
time preference throughout a person’s life. For example, Parkin (1988) examined business 
cycles in the United States, explicitly considering the time-variability of the time preference rate, 
and showed that the rate of time preference was as volatile as technology and leisure preference.  
 
3.1.2  Households 
Households are not intrinsically cooperative. Except in a strict communist economy, households 
do not coordinate themselves to behave as a single entity when consuming goods and services. 
The model in this paper assumes non-cooperative, identical, and infinitely long living 
households and that the number of households is sufficiently large. Each of them equally 
maximizes the expected utility 
 
    dtcuθtE t


0
0 exp  , 
 
subject to 
 
   ttt
t cδkkA,f
dt
dk
  , 
 
where yt, ct, and kt are production, consumption, and capital per capita in period t, respectively; 
                                                          
9 The model in Section 3 is based on the model by Harashima (2012). See also Harashima (2004a, 2013b, 2013c). 
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A is technology and constant; u is the utility function;  tt kAfy ,  is the production 
function;   >θ 0 is the rate of time preference; δ is the rate of depreciation; and E0 is the 
expectations operator conditioned on the agents’ period 0 information set. yt, ct, and kt are 
monotonously continuous and differentiable in t, and u and f are monotonously continuous 
functions of ct and kt, respectively. All households initially have an identical amount of financial 
assets equal to kt, and all households gain the identical amount of income  tt kAfy ,  in each 
period. It is assumed that 
 
0
t
t
dc
cdu
 and 
 
0
2
2

t
t
dc
cud
; thus, households are risk averse. For 
simplicity, the utility function is specified to be the constant relative risk aversion utility 
function  
 
                             
γ
c
cu
γ
t
t



1
1
   if 1γ  
                               tt ccu ln    if 1γ  , 
 
where γ is a constant and  γ0 . In addition, 
 
0
,



t
t
k
kAf
 and 
 
0
2
2



t
t
k
kf
. Both 
technology (A) and labor supply are assumed to be constant. 
 The effects of an upward shift in time preference are shown in Figure 1. Suppose first 
that the economy is at steady state before the shock. After the upward time preference shock, the 
vertical line 0
dt
dct  moves to the left (from the solid vertical line to the dashed vertical line in 
Fig. 1). To keep Pareto efficiency, consumption needs to jump immediately from the steady 
state before the shock (the prior steady state) to point Z. After the jump, consumption proceeds 
on the Pareto efficient saddle path after the shock (the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path) 
from point Z to the lower steady state after the shock (the posterior steady state). Nevertheless, 
this discontinuous jump to Z may be uncomfortable for risk-averse households that wish to 
smooth consumption and not to experience substantial fluctuations. Households may instead 
take a shortcut and, for example, proceed on a path on which consumption is reduced 
continuously from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state (the bold dashed line in Fig. 
1), but this shortcut is not Pareto efficient. 
  Choosing a Pareto inefficient consumption path must be consistent with each 
household’s maximization of its expected utility. To examine the possibility of the rational 
choice of a Pareto inefficient path, the expected utilities between the two options need be 
compared. For this comparison, I assume that there are two options for each non-cooperative 
household with regard to consumption just after an upward shift in time preference. The first is 
a jump option, J, in which a household’s consumption jumps to Z and then proceeds on the 
posterior Pareto efficient saddle path to the posterior steady state. The second is a non-jump 
option, NJ, in which a household’s consumption does not jump but instead gradually decreases 
from the prior steady state to the posterior steady state, as shown by the bold dashed line in 
Figure 1. The household that chooses the NJ option reaches the posterior steady state in period 
 0s . The difference in consumption between the two options in each period t is bt (≥ 0). Thus, 
b0 indicates the difference between Z and the prior steady state. bt diminishes continuously and 
becomes zero in period s. The NJ path of consumption (ct) after the shock is monotonously 
continuous and differentiable in t and 0
dt
dct  if st 0 . In addition,  
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tt ccc ˆ    if st 0  
                             cct        if ts 0  ,  
 
where tcˆ  is consumption when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and c  
is consumption in the posterior steady state. Therefore, 
 
                          0ˆ  ttt ccb    if st 0  
                          0tb             if ts 0  . 
 
  It is also assumed that, when a household chooses a different option from the one the 
other households choose, the difference in the accumulation of financial assets resulting from 
the difference in consumption (bt) before period s between that household and the other 
households is reflected in consumption after period s. That is, the difference in the return on 
financial assets is added to (or subtracted from) the household’s consumption in each period 
after period s. The exact functional form of the addition (or subtraction) is shown in Section 
3.1.4. 
 
3.1.3  Firms 
Unutilized products (bt) are eliminated quickly in each period by firms because holding bt for a 
long period is a cost to firms. Elimination of bt is accomplished by discarding the goods or 
preemptively suspending production, thereby leaving some capital and labor inputs idle. 
However, in the next period, unutilized products are generated again because the economy is not 
proceeding on the Pareto efficient saddle path. Unutilized products are therefore successively 
generated and eliminated. Faced with these unutilized products, firms dispose of the excess 
capital used to generate bt. Disposing of the excess capital is rational for firms because the 
excess capital is an unnecessary cost, but this means that parts of the firms are liquidated, which 
takes time and thus disposing of the excess capital will also take time. If the economy proceeds 
on the NJ path (that is, if all households choose the NJ option), firms dispose of all of the 
remaining excess capital that generates bt and adjust their capital to the posterior steady-state 
level in period s, which also corresponds to households reaching the posterior steady state. Thus, 
if the economy proceeds on the NJ path, capital kt is 
 
                            
tt kkk
ˆ    if st 0  
                            kkt        if ts 0  , 
 
where tkˆ  is capital per capita when proceeding on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path 
and k  is capital per capita in the posterior steady state. 
  The real interest rate it is  
 
 
t
t
t
k
kAf
i



,
 . 
 
Because the real interest rate equals the rate of time preference at steady state, if the economy 
proceeds on the NJ path, 
 
                             θiθ t 
~
  if st 0  
                             θit       if ts 0  , 
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where θ
~
 is the rate of time preference before the shock and θ  is the rate of time preference 
after the shock. 
ti  is monotonously continuous and differentiable in t if st 0 . 
 
3.1.4  Expected utility after the shock 
The expected utility of a household after the shock depends on its choice of the J or NJ path. Let 
Jalone indicate that the household chooses option J, but the other households choose option NJ; 
NJalone indicate that the household chooses option NJ, but the other households choose option 
J; Jtogether indicate that all households choose option J; and NJtogether indicate that all 
households choose option NJ. Let p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) be the subjective probability of a household that 
the other households choose the J option (e.g., p = 0 indicates that all the other households 
choose option NJ). With p, the expected utility of a household when it chooses option J is  
 
       JaloneEpJtogetherpEJE 000 1  ,                (25) 
 
and when it chooses option NJ is 
 
          N J t o g e t h e rEpN J a l o n epENJE 000 1  ,              (26) 
 
where  JaloneE0 ,  NJaloneE0 ,  JtogetherE0 , and  NJtogetherE0  are the expected 
utilities of the household when choosing Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, 
respectively. Given the properties of J and NJ shown in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, 
 
         



  

s
t
s
tt dtcuθtdtbcuθtpEJE ˆexpexp
0
00
 
         



   
s
s
tt dtacuθtdtbcuθtEp
0
0 expexp1  ,      (27) 
 
and 
 
         



   
s
s
ttt dtacuθtdtcuθtpENJE
0
00
ˆexpexp  
         



  

s
s
t dtcuθtdtcuθtEp expexp1
0
0
 ,           (28) 
 
where 
 
 
s s
r
qr drdqibθa
0
exp  ,                       (29) 
 
and  
 
 
s s
r
qrtt drdqibia
0
exp  ,                      (30) 
 
and the shock occurred in period t = 0. Figure 2 shows the paths of Jalone and NJalone. 
Because there is a sufficiently large number of households and the effect of an individual 
household on the whole economy is negligible, in the case of Jalone, the economy almost 
proceeds on the NJ path. Similarly, in the case of NJalone, it almost proceeds on the J path. If 
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the other households choose the NJ option (Jalone or NJtogether), consumption after s is 
constant as c  and capital is adjusted to k  by firms in period s. In addition, at and it are 
constant after s such that at equals a  and is equals θ, because the economy is at the posterior 
steady state. Nevertheless, during the transition period before s, the value of it changes from the 
value of the prior time preference rate to that of the posterior rate. If the other households 
choose option J (NJalone or Jtogether), however, consumption after s is 
tcˆ  and capital is not 
adjusted to k  by firms in period s and remains at tkˆ . 
  As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, the difference in the returns on financial assets for the 
household from the returns for each of the other households is added to (or subtracted from) its 
consumption in each period after period s. This is described by at and a  in equations (27) and 
(28), and equations (29) and (30) indicate that the accumulated difference in financial assets 
resulting from bt increases by compound interest between the period r to s. That is, if the 
household takes the NJalone path, it accumulates more financial assets than each of the other J 
households, and instead of immediately consuming these extra accumulated financial assets 
after period s, the household consumes the returns on them in every subsequent period. If the 
household takes the Jalone path, however, its consumption after s is ac  , as shown in 
equation (27). a  is subtracted because the income of each household,  tt kAfy , , 
including the Jalone household, decreases equally by bt. Each of the other NJ households 
decreases consumption by bt at the same time, which compensates for the decrease in income; 
thus, its financial assets (i.e., capital per capita; kt) are kept equal to tkˆ . The Jalone household, 
however, does not decrease its consumption, and its financial assets become smaller than those 
of each of the other NJ households, which results in the subtraction of a  after period s. 
 
3.2  Pareto inefficient transition path 10 
3.2.1  Rational Pareto inefficient path  
3.2.1.1  Rational choice of a Pareto inefficient path 
Before examining the economy with non-cooperative households, I first show that, if 
households are cooperative, only option J is chosen as the path after the shock because it gives a 
higher expected utility than option NJ. Because there is no possibility of Jalone and NJalone if 
households are cooperative, then    JtogetherEJE 00   and    NJtogetherENJE 00  . 
Therefore,  
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0
0  

s
t
s
ttt dtcucuθtdtcubcuθtE   
 
because 
ttt bcc   and tcc ˆ . 
  Next, I examine the economy with non-cooperative households. First, the special case 
with a utility function with a sufficiently small γ is examined.  
 
Lemma 1: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .  
Proof:     NJtogetherEJaloneE
γ
00
0
lim 

 
                                                          
10 The idea of a rationally chosen Pareto inefficient path was originally presented by Harashima (2004b). 
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              



s
s γ
ttt
γ
dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE
0 0
0
0
0 limexplimexp  
        


s
s
t dtaθtEdtbθtE
0
00 expexp  
         











s
s s s
r
qrt dtθtdrdqibθEdtbθtE expexpexp
0 0
00
 
          



s s s
r
qrt drdqibθsEdtbθtE
0 0
00 expexpexp  
          0e x pe x pe x p
0
0   
s s
t
qt dtdqitsθbθsE  , 
 
because, if  st 0 , then θit   and    
s
t
q dqitsθ expexp . Hence, because   tsθ exp  

s
t
q dqiexp ,     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  for sufficiently small γ.               ■ 
 
  Second, the opposite special case (i.e., a utility function with a sufficiently large γ) is 
examined.  
 
Lemma 2: If   γγ 0  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then  JaloneE0  
  00 NJtogetherE . 
Proof: Because 
tb0 , then  
 
     0lim1lim
11
1




















 




γ
t
γ
tt
γ
tttγγ c
c
c
bc
cubcu
c
γ
 
 
for any period  st  . On the other hand, because a0 , then for any period  st  , if 
1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,  
 
      


















１
γ
γγγ c
a
cuacu
c
γ
1
1
1lim
1
lim  . 
 
Thus,  
 
                         N J t o g e t h e rEJ a l o n eE
c
γ
γγ
001
1
lim 


 
      dtcubcuθt
c
γ
ttt
γ
s
γγ



  limexp
1
lim
01
 
                         dtcuacuθt
c
γ
γsγγ





  limexp
1
lim
1
 
                   00   . 
 
Because 0
1
1


γc
γ
 for any   γγ 1 , then if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
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< 0 for sufficiently large  γ .                                               ■ 
 
The condition 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 indicates that path NJ from c0 to c  deviates sufficiently from 
the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path and reaches the posterior steady state c  not taking 
much time. Because steady states are irrelevant to the degree of risk aversion (γ), both c0 and c  
are irrelevant to γ.  
 By Lemmas 1 and 2, it can be proved that     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  is 
possible. 
 
Lemma 3: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then there is a    γγ 0  such that if  γγ , 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . 
Proof: If  0γ  is sufficiently small, then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  by Lemma 1, 
and if  γ  is sufficiently large and if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, then    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   
0  by Lemma 2. Hence, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
, there is a certain    γγ 0  such that, if 
 γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE .                                ■ 
 
  However,     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE  because both Jtogether and NJalone 
indicate that all the other households choose option J; thus, the values of it and kt are the same as 
those when all households proceed on the posterior Pareto efficient saddle path. Faced with 
these it and kt, deviating alone from the Pareto efficient path (NJalone) gives a lower expected 
utility than Jtogether to the NJ household. Both Jalone and NJtogether indicate that all the other 
households choose option NJ and it and kt are not those of the Pareto efficient path. Hence, the 
sign of    NJtogetherEJaloneE 00   varies depending on the conditions, as Lemma 3 
indicates.  
  By Lemma 3 and the property     000  NJaloneEJtogetherE , the possibility of 
the choice of a Pareto inefficient transition path, that is,     000  NJEJE , is shown. 
 
Proposition 1: If 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 and  γγ , then there is a  10   pp  such that if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE , and if 
*pp  ,     000  NJEJE . 
Proof: By Lemma 3, if  γγ , then     000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  and  JtogetherE0  
  00  NJaloneE . By equations (25) and (26),  
 
         NJaloneEJtogetherEpNJEJE 0000         NJtogetherEJaloneEp 001   . 
 
Thus, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
 and  γγ ,     NJEJE
p
00
0
lim 

    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE  
and          0lim 0000
1


NJaloneEJtogetherENJEJE
p
. Hence, by the intermediate value 
theorem, there is  10   pp  such that if *pp  ,     000  NJEJE  and if *pp  , 
    000  NJEJE .                                                             ■ 
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Proposition 1 indicates that, if 1lim0 
 c
a
γ
,  γγ , and p < p
*
, then the choice of option 
NJ gives the higher expected utility than that of option J to a household; that is, a household 
may make the rational choice of taking a Pareto inefficient transition path. The lemmas and 
proposition require no friction, so a Pareto inefficient transition path can be chosen even in a 
frictionless economy. This result is very important because it offers counter-evidence against 
the conjecture that households never rationally choose a Pareto inefficient transition path in a 
frictionless economy. 
 
3.2.1.2  Conditions for a rational Pareto inefficient path 
The proposition requires several conditions. Among them,  γγ  may appear rather strict. 
If γ* is very large, path NJ will rarely be chosen. However, if path NJ is such that consumption 
is reduced sharply after the shock, the NJ option yields a higher expected utility than the J 
option even though γ is very small. For example, for any   γγ 0 , 
 
             N J t o g e t h e rEJ a l o n eE
ss
00
0
1
lim 

 
                    dtcuacuθt
s
dtcubcuθt
s ss
ttt
s
s
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1
limexp
1
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000
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0
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γ
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γ
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because 
 
     0
0
0
000
1
0
1
00
1
1lnlnln
11
lim b
c
b
ccbcc
γ
c
γ
bc
c
γγ
γ
γ















 


 and  
 
0
1
11
lim
11
lim
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
00 


















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


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
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
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c
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γ
c
γ
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c
γ
γγ
γ
γγ
γ
γ
 because 
0cc  . That is, for 
each combination of path NJ and γ, there is  0s  such that, if  ss , then  JaloneE0  
  00  NJtogetherE . 
  Consider an example in which path NJ is such that bt is constant and bbt  before s 
(Figure 3); thus,  
s
t bsbE
0
0
. In this NJ path, consumption is reduced more sharply than it is 
in the case shown in Figure 2. In this case, because  
s
t bθsbθEa
0
0
, γ0 , and ts cc   
for st  , then                ss
ss
ttt cubcudtθtEdtcubcuθtE
0
0
0
0 expexp  
      ss cubcu
θ
θs
E 
 exp1
0
, and in addition,        

s
dtcuacuθtE exp0  
                    cubθscu
θ
θs
Ecuacu
θ
θs
EcuacudtθtE
s





 expexp
exp 000 . 
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Hence, 
 
               N J t o g e t h e rEJ a l o n eE 00   
             


s
s
ttt dtcuacuθtEdtcubcuθtE expexp 0
0
0
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E ss 
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 
    






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


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θs
θs
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θ
θs
E ss
exp1
expexp1
0
 . 
 
As γ increases, the ratio 
   
   bθscucu
cubcu ss


 decreases; thus, larger values of s can satisfy 
    000  NJtogetherEJaloneE . For example, suppose that c = 10, cs = 10.2, b = 0.3, and θ 
= 0.05. If 1γ , then s
*
 = 1.5 at the minimum, and if 5γ , then s
*
 = 6.8 at the minimum. This 
result implies that, if option NJ is such that consumption is reduced relatively sharply after the 
shock (e.g., bbt  ) and 
*pp  , option NJ will usually be chosen. Choosing option NJ is not a 
special case observed only if γ is very large, but option NJ can normally be chosen when the 
value of γ is within usually observed values. Conditions for generating a rational Pareto 
inefficient transition path therefore are not strict. In a recession, consumption usually declines 
sharply after the shock, which suggests that households have chosen the NJ option. 
 
3.3  Nash equilibrium 
3.3.1  A Nash equilibrium consisting of NJ strategies  
A household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option, considering other 
households’ choices. All households know that each of them forms expectations about the future 
values of its utility and makes a decision in the same manner. Since all households are identical, 
the best response of each household is identical. Suppose that there are  NΗ   identical 
households in the economy where H is sufficiently large (as assumed in Section 3.1). Let 
 10  ηη qq  be the probability that a household  Ηη   chooses option J. The average 
utility of the other households almost equals that of all households because H is sufficiently 
large. Hence, the average expected utilities of the other households that choose the J and NJ 
options are E0(Jtogether) and E0(NJtogether), respectively. Hence, the payoff matrix of the 
Η-dimensional symmetric mixed strategy game can be described as shown in Table 1. Each 
identical household determines its behavior on the basis of this payoff matrix.  
 In this mixed strategy game, the strategy profiles  
 
(q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), (
*** ,...,, ppp ), (0,0,…,0)} 
 
are Nash equilibria for the following reason. By Proposition 1, the best response of household η 
is J (i.e., qη = 1) if 
*pp  , indifferent between J and NJ (i.e., any  10,qη  ) if 
*pp  , and NJ 
(i.e., qη = 0) if 
*pp  . Because all households are identical, the best-response correspondence 
of each household is identical such that qη = 1 if 
*pp  , [0,1] if *pp  , and 0 if *pp   for 
any household Ηη . Hence, the mixed strategy profiles (1, 1,…,1), ( *** ,...,, ppp ), and 
(0,0,…,0) are the intersections of the graph of the best-response correspondences of all 
households. The Pareto efficient saddle path solution (1,1,…,1) (i.e., Jtogether) is a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium, but a Pareto inefficient transition path (0,0,…,0) ( i.e., NJtogether) is 
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also a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
( *** ,...,, ppp ).  
 
3.3.2  Selection of equilibrium 
Determining which Nash equilibrium, either NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or Jtogether (1,1,…,1), is 
dominant requires refinements of the Nash equilibrium, which necessitate additional criteria. 
Here, if households have a risk-averse preference in the sense that they avert the worst scenario 
when its probability is not known, households suppose a very low p and select the NJtogether 
(0,0,…,0) equilibrium. Because 
 
               NJaloneEJaloneE 00   
               dtacuacuθtdtcubcuθtE s
s
ttttt 


0
0
ˆexpexp  
                         


s
s
ttt dtcuacuθtdtcubcuθtE
0
0 expexp  
              000  N J t o g e t h e rEJ a l o n eE  ,                                (31) 
 
by Lemma 3, Jalone is the worst choice in terms of the amount of payoff, followed by 
NJtogether, and NJalone, and Jtogether is the best. The outcomes of choosing option J are more 
dispersed than those of option NJ. If households have a risk-averse preference in the 
above-mentioned sense and avert the worst scenario when they have no information on its 
probability, a household will prefer the less dispersed option (NJ), fearing the worst situation 
that the household alone substantially increases consumption while the other households 
substantially decrease consumption after the shock. This behavior is rational because it is 
consistent with preferences. Because all households are identical and know inequality (31), all 
households will equally suppose that they all prefer the less dispersed NJ option; therefore, all 
of them will suppose a very low p, particularly 0p , and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) 
equilibrium, which is the Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. Thereby, unlike most 
multiple equilibria models, the problem of indeterminacy does not arise, and “animal spirits” 
(e.g., pessimism or optimism) are unnecessary to explain the selection. 
 
3.4  Amplified generation of unutilized resources 
A Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path successively generates unutilized products (bt). 
They are left unused, discarded, or preemptively not produced during the path. Unused or 
discarded goods and services indicate a decline in sales and an increase in inventory for firms. 
Preemptively suspended production results in an increase in unemployment and idle capital. As 
a result, profits decline and some parts of firms need to be liquidated, which is unnecessary if 
the economy proceeds on the J path (i.e., the posterior Pareto efficient path). If the liquidation is 
implemented immediately after the shock, bt will no longer be generated, but such a liquidation 
would generate a tremendous shock. The process of the liquidation, however, will take time 
because of various frictions, and excess capital that generates bt will remain for a long period. 
During the period when capital is not reduced to the posterior steady-state level, unutilized 
products are successively generated. In a period, bt is generated and eliminated, but in the next 
period, another, new, bt is generated and eliminated. This cycle is repeated in every period 
throughout the transition path, and it implies that demand is lower than supply in every period. 
This phenomenon may be interpreted as a general glut or a persisting disequilibrium by some 
definitions of equilibrium. That is, bt is another source of output gaps than frictions.  
 
2.5  Time preference shock as the exceptional shock 
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Not all shocks result in a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. If anything, this type of 
shock is limited because such a shock needs to force consumption to fluctuate very jaggedly to 
maintain Pareto efficiency. A Pareto inefficient path is preferred, because these substantially 
jagged fluctuations can be averted. An upward time preference shock is one shock that 
necessitates a substantially jagged fluctuation as shown in Figure 1. Other examples are rare 
because shocks that do not change the steady state (e.g., monetary shocks) are not relevant. One 
other example is technology regression, which would move the vertical line 0
dt
dct  to the left 
in Figure 1 and necessitate a jagged consumption path to keep Pareto efficiency. In this sense, 
technology and time preference shocks have similar effects on economic fluctuations. However, 
a technology regression also simultaneously moves the curve 0
dt
dkt  downwards, and 
accordingly, the Pareto efficient saddle path also moves downwards. Therefore, the jagged 
consumption is smoothed out to some extent. As a result, the substantially jagged consumption 
that can generate a recession would require a large-scale, sudden, and sharp regression in 
technology, which does not seem very likely. An upward time preference shock, however, only 
moves the vertical line 0
dt
dct  to the left. 
  In some macro-economic models with multiple equilibria, changing equilibria may 
necessitate substantially jagged consumption to keep Pareto optimality. There are many types of 
multiple equilibra models that depend on various types of increasing returns, externalities, or 
complementarities, but they are vulnerable to a number of criticisms (e.g., insufficient 
explanation of the switching mechanism; see, e.g., Morris and Shin, 2001). Examining the 
properties, validity, and plausibility of each of these many and diverse models is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
4  PHILLIPS CURVE 
 
4.1  Models of the Phillips curve 
4.1.1  Trend inflation and inflation 
The micro-foundation of trend inflation discussed in Section 2 indicates that inflation πt is a 
function of trend inflation T
tπ , in particular such that  
 
,t
T
tt νππ 1                        ,      (32) 
 
where ν1,t is a variable that represents factors other than trend inflation in period t. Equation (32) 
indicates that the aggregate supply equation (the Phillips curve) is modeled as a variable moving 
around a trend and occasionally diverting from the trend because of other factors. 
 
4.1.2  Output gaps and inflation 
Section 2 shows that shifts in θP change the path of trend inflation (
T
tπ ) unless θG is 
immediately changed in the same direction and by the same magnitude as θP. Usually θG will 
not change immediately after a shift in θP, so the path of trend inflation will usually change after 
a shift in θP. Hence, πt changes as θP shifts; thus, πt is a function of θP such that  
 
 P,tθt θhπ   .                            (33) 
 
 In Section 3, I showed that outputs yt fluctuate with shifts of θP and unutilized 
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resources (bt) are generated. The unutilized resources indicate the existence of output gaps. The 
output gaps xt can be described as follows:  
 
    ttt yyx
~lnln   , 
 
where 
ty
~  is yt at the steady state or on the saddle path. Let also 
 
    tttb,t byyx  lnln  . 
 
That is, xb,t is the output gap generated owing to bt in period t and is a part of xt. Because bt is a 
function of θP, xb,t is also a function of θP such that 
 
 P,tbtb θhx ,  ,                             (34) 
 
where θP,t is θP in period t. Suppose that θP,t is a Markov process and shifts in θP occasionally 
occur. By equations (33) and (34), xb.t will be observed to correlate with πt such that  
 
  b,tbθt xhhπ 1  .                           (35) 
 
Equation (35) does not indicate causation; it merely indicates that there is a correlation between 
πt and xb,t. The causations are described by equations (33) and (34).  
 There is, however, a conventional correlation between inflation and output gaps, and it 
is caused by frictions in price flexibility. The output gaps generated by frictions are traditionally 
thought to be the only sources of output gaps in the NKPC. Suppose that the sources of output 
gaps are only bt and frictions. Thus, the output gaps that are generated by frictions in period t 
are  
 
    ttttF ybyx
~lnln,   . 
 
That is,  
 
 xt = xb,t + xF,t . 
 
According to the micro-foundation of the NKPC, xF,t is correlated with πt in a forward-looking 
manner such that   
 
  ,ti|tF,tFt νxhπ 21     for i = 0,1,2,…..         (36) 
 
Where ν2,t is a variable that represents factors other than trend inflation and 1i|tF,tx  is the 
iF,tx  expected in period t – 1. 
 
4.1.3  Three models of inflation in the aggregate supply equation 
Combining equations (32) and (36), inflation can be modeled as  
 
                 1|,  titFFTtt xhππ    for i = 0,1,2,…. .  
 
With i.i.d. shocks εt, the data generation mechanism of πt can be modeled as  
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  ttiF,tFTtt εxhππ ,11|     for i = 0,1,2,…..       (37) 
 
or more simply 
 
,tF,t|t
T
tt εxπaπ 1111    ,                       (38) 
 
where a1 and φ1 are constants and expected to be positive, and ε1,t is an i.i.d. shock in period t. It 
is important to note that equations (37) and (38) are aggregate supply equations that are firmly 
constructed on a micro-foundation basis. Another important point is that equations (37) and (38) 
do not include the correlation indicated by equation (35). 
 Equations (37) and (38) superficially resemble the pure NKPC and the hybrid NKPC, 
but they are actually completely different. Typical pure and hybrid NKPCs can be described, 
respectively, as  
 
,tF,t|tt εxπ 212                              (39) 
 
and  
 
 
,tF,t|ttt εxπaπ 31313     ,                      (40) 
 
where a3, φ2, and φ3 are constants and expected to be positive, and ε2,t and ε2,t are disturbances in 
period t. That is, a pure NKPC indicates that inflation is a function of xF,t and a hybrid NKPC 
indicates that inflation is a function of both lagged inflation and xF,t. An important difference 
between equation (38) and equations (39) and (40) is that equation (38) includes trend inflation 
but the others do not.  
 Conceptually, most models of NKPC assume that xb,t does not exist and xt consists 
only of xF,t as shown in equations (39) and (40), and data of xt are usually regarded to be 
identical to those of xF,t. However, if xb,t does exist, estimations of equations (39) and (40) using 
date of xt as those of xF,t are in reality estimations of the following aggregate supply equations, 
respectively: 
 
  ,tb,t|tF,t|t,tt|tt εxxεxπ 2112212                    (41) 
 
and  
 
   ,tb,t|tF,t|tt|t,tt|ttt εxxπaεxπaπ 31131331313     ,          (42) 
 
where 
1t|tx  and 1b,t|tx  are xt and xb,t expected in period t–1, respectively. Although 
conceptually xt = xF,t in the NKPC, in reality, inflation is a function of xt (= xF,t + xb,t) in 
estimation models of the pure NKPC and a function of lagged inflation and xt (= xF,t + xb,t) in 
hybrid NKPC models. Equations (41) and (42) are therefore actual estimation models of the 
pure NKPC and the hybrid NKPC, respectively. In the following discussion, equation (38) is 
referred to as Model 1, and equations (41) and (42) are referred to as Models 2 and 3, 
respectively.  
 
4.1.4  Superiority of Model 1 
In the sense that Model 1 is constructed on the basis of purely forward-looking 
micro-foundations of both trend inflation and friction, it is superior to Model 3 (hybrid NKPC), 
which lacks a micro-foundation for including lagged inflation. Model 2 (pure NKPC), however, 
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does have a micro-foundation for the friction component, but it is usually empirically rejected, 
whereas the results of estimates from Model 3 are usually empirically accepted. Model 1 cannot 
be easily estimated empirically because it is difficult to distinguish between xF,t and xb,t in the 
data, but it is highly likely that Model 1 would be empirically supported because the trend 
inflation in Model 1 and the lagged inflation in Model 3 play almost the same role in the 
estimation of both models. Model 1 is therefore superior to Model 2 in the sense that it would 
most likely be empirically supported. As a whole, therefore, it is likely that Model 1 is the 
closest to the true mechanism of the three models. 
 
4.2  Are frictions important? 
 
4.2.1  Inappropriateness of the pure NKPC (Model 2) 
Most empirical research has rejected Model 2, and the reason can be understood by comparing 
Model 2 with Model 1. If Model 1 is the true mechanism, Model 2 will be naturally rejected 
empirically because the movement of trend inflation ( T
tπ ) cannot be captured sufficiently only 
by xt (= xF,t + xb,t), as shown in Section 2. The estimates of φ2 in Model 2 therefore will be 
always statistically non-significant as shown in many empirical researches. This result seems 
natural, because it is well known that inflation is persistent, and output gaps caused by frictions 
(xF,t) cannot, by their nature, be persistent. Trend inflation, however, can be persistent. For these 
reasons, Model 1 is superior to Model 2. 
 
4.2.2  A problem in hybrid NKPC (Model 3) 
Unlike Model 2, Model 3 lacks a micro-foundation, but the results generated from the model 
match with empirical data. If Model 1 is the true mechanism, it is natural that the results from 
Model 3 would fit the empirical data. Suppose for simplicity that zt = 2 in equation (2) because 
2lim 

t
t
z as shown in Section 2. By equation (2),  
 
      221 16    ttθθππ PGTtTt  
                        1261   tθθπ PG
T
t
                      (43) 
 
for t ≥ s. Note that equation (1) indicates that the path of T
tπ just after a shift of θP is more 
complex than what is shown in equation (43) because T
tπ is influenced by its past path. 
Nevertheless, for simplicity, I assume that equation (43) holds even just after a shift in θP 
because 2lim 

t
t
z , and the path of 
T
tπ will soon approach the path indicated in equation (43).  
 By combining equation (43) with Model 1,  
 
               126 111121111    tθθaεεxxππ PG,t,t|tF,tF,t|ttt  .  (44) 
 
Model 1 is transformed to be a function of lagged inflation (πt-1); that is, Model 1 indicates that 
πt is auto-correlated, as Model 3 also indicates. Model 3 includes lagged inflation without 
showing its micro-foundation, but Model 1 provides this micro-foundation and thus validates 
the inclusion of lagged inflation in an aggregate supply equation. 
 At the same time, however, Model 1 (equation [44]) indicates that the coefficient of 
πt-1 should be unity. As is well known, estimates of a3 in Model 3 are usually far less than unity 
(e.g., 0.5). The reason for the difference is that, although Models 1 and 3 are similar in that they 
include lagged inflation, other explanatory variables are not the same. The explanatory variables 
of πt in Model 1 are xF,t and θP, and those in Model 3 are xF,t and xb,t. Combining Model 3 with 
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equation (44) (i.e., Model 1) yields   
 
             1261 11112111311313    tθθaεεxxεxxπa PG,t,t|tF,tF,t|t,tb,t|tF,t|tt  . 
 
Suppose for simplicity that 0111,3  ,t,tt εεε  and 02|1,1|,   ttFttF xx ; thus,  
 
        113113 1261   b,t|tF,t|tPGt xxtθθaπa   
 
should always hold. If a3 = 1 as Model 1 indicates,  
 
      126 1113    tθθaxx PGb,t|tF,t|t  
 
should be always held. Both  113   b,t|tF,t|t xx  and     126 1  tθθa PG  are negative, 
and thus estimates of Model 3 for a3 = 1 can be statistically significant. However, even if a3 < 1, 
 
        1261 113113    tθθaπaxx PGtb,t|tF,t|t  
 
can be fallaciously satisfied if        01261 113   tθθaπa PGt  and a larger value 
of φ3 is given. In particular, when πt is low, the probability that 
      1261 113   tθθaπa PGt  is negative will be high, and the probability that a3 is 
estimated to be far less than unity will be also high. In this case, the estimated value of φ3 is 
fallaciously larger than the case of a3 = 1. On the other hand, when πt is high, a3 will be 
estimated to be close to unity because       1261 113   tθθaπa PGt is positive 
unless a3 is close to unity. Even if a3 is estimated to be far less than unity and statistically 
significant, therefore, Model 1 indicates that this is a fallacious result.  
 
4.2.3  Frictions are less important than previously thought 
In addition to erroneously small values of a3, the fact that estimated values of φ3 will be 
fallaciously larger is also important because it indicates that the influence of frictions (φ3) will 
also be overestimated in Model 3. Furthermore, another factor influences the overestimation of 
frictions. φ3 is the coefficient not of xF,t but of xt (= xF,t + xb,t); thus, φ3 reflects not only frictions 
but also bt. Model 1’s micro-foundation indicates that the output gaps caused by time preference 
shifts (xb,t) are irrelevant to the data generation mechanism of πt. Equation (35) merely indicates 
that πt is superficially correlated with xb,t, but there is no causation between the two. Because φ3 
reflects both correlations between πt and xF,t and πt and xb,t, the estimates of φ3 will be influenced 
not only by frictions but also by the movement of bt. With this effect, therefore, the influence of 
frictions, if it is measured by φ3, will be overestimated.  
 The above two factors combined will greatly bias estimates of φ3 upwards. It is likely 
therefore that the influence of frictions is largely overestimated if Model 3 is used for the 
evaluation. This finding has an important implication. Frictions have been regarded as an 
important factor in economic activities, but their role may be far smaller than has been 
previously thought. Even though some degree of frictions may actually exist and have real 
impacts, the results presented here indicate that the importance of frictions should not be 
exaggerated. Furthermore, this is most likely true not only for inflation but also for more general 
economic activities. This conclusion seems very natural, because it is highly likely that humans 
are sufficiently rational and can quickly and fully exploit the opportunities frictions provide and 
minimize the obstruction caused to economic activities by frictions.   
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4.3  Monetary policies 
Monetary policies have usually been implemented on the basis of Model 2 or Model 3. If 
monetary policies were to be implemented on the basis of Model 1, then the effects could be 
different, so monetary policies based on Model 1 are examined in this section.  
 
4.3.1  Aggregate demand equation 
An examination of monetary policies requires not only an aggregate supply equation but also an 
aggregate demand equation. The following is a typical forward-looking New Keynesian 
aggregate demand equation (e.g., Clarida et al., 1999; Svensson and Woodford, 2003):  
 
  tt|ttt|rt|tt ηrπiβxx   11111                   (45) 
 
where it is the nominal interest rate; r is the real interest rate at steady state; βr is a constant 
coefficient; and ηt is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean. Equation (45) is obtained under the 
assumption that xt is generated only by frictions. In other words, equation (45) assumes that xt = 
xF,t. However, in Model 1, xt = xF,t + xb,t. Hence, to be consistent with Model 1, equation (45) 
should be changed to  
 
  tt|ttt|rt|tFtF ηrπiβxx   11111,,  .               (46) 
 
Therefore, 
 
        tt|ttt|rt|tt|tt|tttt ηrπiβybyyby   111111111 ~expln~expln  
 
and thus 
 
    tt|ttt|rt|tbtbt|tt ηrπiβxxxx   11111,,11  .          (47) 
 
Equation (47) indicates that xt is influenced not only by rπi t|ttt|   111 but also 
by
11,,  t|tbtb xx . For example, when θP,t shifts upwards, 011,,   t|tbtb xx  because 
0, tbx , 011,  t|tbx  and 11,,  t|tbtb xx ; thus, xt decreases by 11,,  t|tbtb xx  even if 
the effect of friction does not exist. Note that xb,t is an exogenous variable for the central bank.  
 
4.3.2  Monetary policies 
4.3.2.1  Utilizing frictions 
Conventional monetary policy controls inflation and output gaps by utilizing frictions through 
the manipulation of nominal interest rates. However, Model 1 indicates that when economic 
fluctuations are caused by shifts in θP, inflation and output gaps are not necessarily controlled 
by conventional monetary policy because xF,t and xb,t are both generated. For example, when θP 
shifts downwards, xb,t increases and 
T
tπ also increases. The response of conventional monetary 
policy is to raise nominal interest rates to make xF,t decrease through equation (46) (the 
aggregate demand equation) and consequently make πt decrease through the aggregate supply 
equation.  
 This conventional operation focuses only on xF,t and does not consider the effect of the 
shift of θP on 
T
tπ . Model 1, however, indicates that πt depends on 
T
tπ , which is not affected by 
xF,t. Hence, Model 1 indicates that πt is not necessarily sufficiently controlled through the use of 
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conventional monetary policy. To stabilize πt by the conventional monetary policy, nominal 
interest rates should be raised far more than would be done with the conventional policy, at least 
up to the point where the effect of xF,t on πt overwhelms the effect of 
T
tπ on πt. Even if nominal 
interest rates are raised to this far higher rate, T
tπ will accelerate unless θG is sufficiently 
reduced, as shown in Section 3. Nominal interest rates therefore should continue to be increased 
successively and indefinitely to stabilize inflation. Conversely, if θP has a large shift upward, the 
nominal interest rate will have to be reduced to zero (the lower bound of the nominal interest 
rate) unless θG is sufficiently increased. In this case, deflation will accelerate if θG is not 
sufficiently increased. 
 There is a great deal of evidence, however, that inflation has been stabilized by 
conventional monetary policy. I explore the possible reasons for this in the following sections.  
 
4.3.2.2  Controlling the government’s time preference 
Although trend inflation T
tπ cannot be controlled by conventional monetary policy, it can be 
controlled through other types of monetary policy. The central bank can stabilize T
tπ by 
controlling the time preference rate of government (θG). As shown in Section 2, by manipulating 
nominal interest rates, the central bank can force the government to change θG. If θG changes 
according to the central bank’s plan, then T
tπ will eventually stabilize. Model 1 indicates that, if 
T
tπ is stabilized at the target rate, πt will also stabilize in the sense that πt will not accelerate or 
decelerate and will remain near the target rate. For example, when θP shifts downwards and 
T
tπ begins to accelerate, the central bank should raise nominal interest rates and force the 
government to lower θG to stabilize 
T
tπ . If θG is successfully lowered as planned, 
T
tπ will 
stabilize.  
 Section 2 shows that acceleration and deceleration of trend inflation are caused by the 
difference between θG and θP. Therefore, only monetary policy aimed at controlling the 
government’s time preference rate can eventually stabilize inflation in the sense that πt does not 
accelerate or decelerate. Conversely, the monetary policy of utilizing frictions plays only a 
minor role in the process of inflation stabilization.  
 
4.3.2.3  Indistinguishable effects of monetary policies 
The monetary policy of utilizing frictions (conventional monetary policy) nevertheless has been 
regarded as the main player in inflation stabilization because the tools used in both types of 
monetary policy (utilizing frictions and controlling θG) are the same. Both types of policy 
manipulate nominal interest rates. In addition, the directions of the effects of both policy types 
are the same; for example, if nominal interest rates are raised, inflation decreases. Hence, the 
effects of the two types of monetary policy are not easily distinguishable. Even if a central bank 
consciously implements a monetary policy of utilizing frictions, it automatically also 
implements the monetary policy of controlling θG at the same time. If inflation stabilizes as a 
result of the operation, the central bank may believe that the monetary policy of utilizing 
frictions was effective, even though it was the policy of controlling θG that was effective. This 
indistinguishable nature of the effects of the policy therefore will lead to the incorrect belief that 
the monetary policy of utilizing frictions is very effective for inflation stabilization even when 
θP shifts.  
 
4.3.2.4  Power to control output gaps 
The aggregate demand equation that is consistent with Model 1 (equations [46] and [47]) 
indicates another important nature of monetary policy. Monetary policies, whether utilizing 
frictions or controlling θG, do not have enough power to stabilize output gaps. Because xb,t is 
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exogenously given for the central bank, monetary policies cannot eliminate xb,t. By decreasing 
tFx , through equation (46), tx becomes smaller to some extent, but a large tx will continue 
to exist because xb,t continues to exist. The results from Model 1 indicate that we should not 
expect to stabilize large output gaps through monetary policies, although small output gaps 
caused by frictions may be stabilized by them. In contrast, monetary policies—particularly the 
monetary policy of controlling θG —are very effective for stabilizing inflation. 
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Pure and hybrid NKPCs have been criticized for empirical failures and the lack of 
micro-foundation, respectively. An alternative approach to the Phillips curve is to focus on trend 
inflation. In this paper, a micro-foundation of trend inflation is shown. Another important factor 
in the Phillips curve is the nature of output gaps. In the NKPC, output gaps are assumed to be 
generated only by frictions, but in this paper another source of output gaps is considered. These 
output gaps are generated as a Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto 
inefficient transition path of consumption to the steady state.  
 The model presented in this paper is superior to the hybrid NKPC because it is 
constructed on the basis of purely forward-looking micro-foundations of both trend inflation and 
friction, and it is superior to the pure NKPC in the sense that it can be empirically supported. 
Comparisons between the new model and both types of NKPC indicate that the role of frictions 
has been overestimated and that frictions are less important than previously thought. Even 
though some amount of frictions may actually exist, their importance should not be exaggerated. 
 The model also indicates that the conventional monetary policy of utilizing frictions 
cannot necessarily stabilize inflation. In contrast, the monetary policy of controlling θG is very 
effective. A problem is that the effects of both types of monetary policy are not distinguishable. 
This indistinguishable nature results in the incorrect belief that the monetary policy of utilizing 
frictions (conventional monetary policy) is very effective for inflation stabilization even when 
θP shifts. 
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Figure 2: The paths of Jalone and NJalone 
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Figure 3: A Pareto inefficient transition path 
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Table 1  The payoff matrix 
 
              Any other household 
  J  NJ  
H
o
u
se
h
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ld
 A
       
J  E0(Jtogether), E0(Jtogether) E0(Jalone), E0(NJtogether) 
      
NJ  E0(NJalone), E0(Jtogether) E0(NJtogether), E0(NJtogether) 
 
 
 
